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Legal Reform:
China’s Law-Stability Paradox
Benjamin L. Liebman
Abstract: In the 1980s and 1990s, China devoted extensive resources to constructing a legal system, in
part in the belief that legal institutions would enhance both stability and regime legitimacy. Why, then,
did China’s leadership retreat from using law when faced with perceived increases in protests, citizen complaints, and social discontent in the 2000s? This law-stability paradox suggests that party-state leaders
do not trust legal institutions to play primary roles in addressing many of the most complex issues resulting
from China’s rapid social transformation. This signi½es a retreat not only from legal reform, but also
from the rule-based model of authoritarian governance that has contributed much to the resilience of the
Chinese system. The law-stability paradox also highlights the dif½culties facing efforts by China’s new
leadership to reinvigorate legal reform.
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o robust legal institutions support or subvert
efforts to maintain social stability in an authoritarian
state? Over the past decade, this question has become central to discussions concerning legal reform
in China. In the 1980s and 1990s, China devoted extensive resources to constructing a legal system, including training legal professionals, encouraging
greater use of the courts, and adopting new laws
designed to regulate and constrain state conduct. In
the 2000s, in contrast, the Chinese party-state’s focus shifted toward emphasizing resolution of disputes outside the formal legal system, negotiated
outcomes in the formal legal system, flexible application of rules and procedures, and greater oversight of judges and other legal professionals.1
This essay focuses on what I refer to as China’s
law-stability paradox. Having devoted extensive
resources to constructing a legal system in the 1980s
and 1990s, why did China’s leadership retreat from
using law when faced with perceived increases in
protests, citizen complaints, and social discontent
in the 2000s? China’s legal reforms have been
designed in part to further stability. Yet party-state
© 2014 by Benjamin L. Liebman
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leaders appear not to trust legal institutions to play primary roles in addressing
many of the most complex issues resulting from China’s rapid social transformation. The party-state has prioritized rapid
resolution of conflict over adherence to
legal procedures.
In China, the term social instability is often
understood to refer speci½cally to incidents of protest or social conflict. Yet the
phrase has evolved to cover a much broader swath of activity and discourse, including online discussions of high-pro½le
issues and any conduct that the party-state
views as a potential threat to its authority
or legitimacy, including corruption, group
litigation, and virtually any publicly discussed controversial topic. Social instability in China thus refers narrowly to acts
of protest and broadly to conduct that
party-state of½cials view as having the
potential to create unrest or to challenge
the party-state’s power.
Evidence from China suggests that top
leadership has in recent years perceived
adherence to legal rules as a constraint on
efforts to maintain social stability.2 This
approach may be due to concerns that
stronger legal institutions could threaten
Communist Party control. But recent attitudes toward law also reflect party-state
efforts to maintain legitimacy by being responsive to the public, as well as uncertainty about the utility of law in managing a
period of rapid change. Law has become an
important governance tool in China, but
adherence to legal procedures is not a
source of party-state legitimacy. Recognizing China’s law-stability paradox challenges Western arguments regarding the
role legal reforms have played in the construction of China’s form of authoritarianism,3 suggesting a retreat not only from
legal reform but also from the rule-based
model of authoritarian governance that
has contributed much to the resilience of
the Chinese system.
143 (2) Spring 2014

The law-stability paradox also highlights Benjamin L.
the dif½culties facing efforts to reinvigo- Liebman
rate legal reform. Under the slogan “rule
of law China,” newly appointed Communist Party General Secretary and President
Xi Jinping has signaled a desire to enhance
legal reform and force of½cial actors to
obey legal norms. The Communist Party
Central Committee’s “Resolution on Several Important Issues on Comprehensively
Deepening Reform” (or simply, the Third
Plenum resolution), issued in November
2013, outlines some potentially important
reforms to the legal system. Xi’s comments
and the resolution have brought cautious
optimism to many people working within
the Chinese legal system who have viewed
policies of the past decade as an assault
on legal norms and the idea of rule-based
governance. Yet other recent developments, including renewed emphasis on
stability and detentions of legal activists,
suggest that fundamental changes to of½cial attitudes about the role law plays in
China are unlikely. The law-stability paradox suggests that reform requires not
only renewed commitment to the use of
legal procedures and institutions, but also
breaking the cycle of distrust that undermines the authority of legal institutions
and rethinking how the party-state conceives of its own legitimacy.

X i Jinping’s comments endorsing the

concept of “rule of law China” and the reforms announced following the Third
Plenum in November 2013 have been widely viewed as efforts by Xi to mark a clean
break from his predecessors, especially following the fall of Bo Xilai, the former Communist Party Secretary of Chongqing
whose populist approach was seen by
many as a direct assault on rule-based governance. Xi is not the ½rst Chinese leader to
use the rhetoric of law to distinguish himself from his predecessors. Deng Xiaoping’s
embrace of legal reforms in the late 1970s
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and 1980s was in signi½cant part a reaction
to the chaos and violence of the Cultural
Revolution.
China’s legal reforms initially focused on
creating a legal framework for economic
development.4 By the 1990s, the focus of
new laws expanded to include a range of
other issues, from environmental protection and women’s rights to administrative laws that facilitate challenges to state
action and regulate state conduct. The
number of trained legal personnel also
expanded rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s,
with the total number of lawyers increasing from 3,000 in 1978 to more than
160,000 by the early 2000s. Professionalization was explicitly encouraged: hundreds of law schools and law departments
opened; legal expertise developed within
the National People’s Congress and other
law-drafting bodies; and beginning in
2002, all new judges, procurators, and lawyers were required to hold university
degrees and pass a uni½ed national bar
exam.5 Signi½cant attention was devoted
to making the legal system accessible to
ordinary people. In the late 1990s and
early 2000s, China devoted resources to
constructing a state-run legal aid system,
and for the ½rst time permitted the development of quasi-independent public interest law organizations. Debate about legal
issues also became common in the media
in the 1990s, advancing popular knowledge
of law.
Although reforms to the legal system in
the 1980s and 1990s were impressive, abuses continued to be widespread. Many rights
set forth in the large volume of new laws
went unenforced. The Chinese party-state
continued to rely on political campaigns
to address the most signi½cant problems
–including threats of instability–and to
enforce new legal norms. Courts and procurators remained under direct Communist
Party oversight. Party political-legal committees and individual party and gov-

ernment of½cials played signi½cant roles
in influencing outcomes in court and in
resolving disputes outside the formal
legal system, reflecting a continuation of
revolutionary-era distrust of autonomous
institutions.6 Populism remained an important factor in shaping legal outcomes.
Legal rules were designed primarily to
facilitate, not constrain, party-state policy,
in particular economic development. Law
was not a mechanism for oversight over
the party-state itself.
General Secretary Hu Jintao and Premier
Wen Jiabao took power in 2003 against a
backdrop of rising concerns about social
unrest and inequality. They initially appeared to use law to signal a break from
the past. Legal scholars and lawyers seized
on a perceived new commitment to reform
to call for greater enforcement of the constitution and a deepening of legal reform.7
There were some modest successes for
advocates of reform, most notably the 2003
abolishment of the custody and repatriation detention system for migrant workers following an outcry from the media
and legal academics concerning abuses in
the system. The sars outbreak the same
year led to widespread calls for, and
apparent new state commitment to, increased government transparency. China
also amended its constitution in 2004 to
add provisions protecting human rights
and private property.
Despite this initial optimism, the 2003–
2013 Hu–Wen era became known for its
deemphasis on legal reform. In the ½rst
two decades of legal reform, embrace of
law and rule-based governance was largely
understood as enhancing the party-state’s
authority and legitimacy. In the Hu–Wen
period, in contrast, the Chinese leadership appeared to develop a more skeptical
approach to law. The result was a decade
of slowing legal reform and greater party
oversight over the legal system, what legal
scholar Carl Minzner has called China’s

Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences

“turn against law,” and what I have elsewhere described as China’s “return to populist legality.”8
New of½cial attitudes toward law in the
Hu–Wen era were manifest most clearly
in the emphasis on maintaining social
stability and constructing a “harmonious
society.” Stability has been a key concern
throughout the reform era. In the 2000s,
however, stability attracted renewed
attention as reports of protest and unrest
mounted. In the 1980s and 1990s, legal
reforms were largely thought to promote
stability: it was better to have disgruntled
citizens suing in court than protesting or
burning down government of½ces. In the
2000s, in contrast, of½cial sensitivity to
unrest resulted in deemphasis on legal
procedures and the creation of incentives
for local of½cials to maintain stability,
often at the expense of following legal
norms.
In the 2000s, courts came under pressure
to mediate the majority of civil cases.
Courts received explicit targets for mediating percentages of cases; mediation rates
in some jurisdictions exceeded 80 percent.9 This trend marked a shift from the
1990s, when adjudicated outcomes had
become the norm in most cases decided
by China’s courts. Of½cial encouragement
of mediation reflected the belief that
mediated cases are less likely than adjudicated cases to result in escalation and
unrest. Mediation also ½t well into of½cial
policy of re-embracing revolutionary-era
concepts of “justice for the people” and
the “Ma Xiwu adjudication method,”
which emphasized resolving disputes
immediately, on the spot, and in line with
popular views.10
High mediation rates lead to concerns
that litigants are being coerced into agreeing to mediated outcomes and denied the
opportunity to resolve cases in accordance with the law. In many contentious
disputes, mediation is handled through
143 (2) Spring 2014

“grand mediation,” led by local party Benjamin L.
leaders, with courts being one of many Liebman
actors at the table. Of½cials and judges
serving as mediators often act as fact
½nders, pressuring parties and their families to agree to settlements.
Many judges view mediation as subverting their proper role and adding to their
workload. Yet mediation also protects the
courts. Mediated outcomes insulate courts
from appellate review and prevent cases
from being made public, reducing the possibility that judges will be held accountable for incorrectly decided rulings. In
some substantive areas, most notably
labor, heavy reliance on mediation outside
the courts also reflects the courts’ lack of
capacity to handle a surge in disputes.11
Mediation in the 2000s extended to administrative cases (where it had previously been banned by the 1989 Administrative Litigation Law) and criminal cases.
Equity concerns are particularly apparent in criminal cases. Many defendants in
minor criminal cases who agree to compensate their victims receive suspended
sentences. Those who do not pay compensation, or are unable to do so, generally
receive prison terms.12 In more serious
cases, compensation payments by defendants or their families to victims can determine whether defendants receive suspended death sentences or life terms
rather than the death penalty. The emphasis on compensation and negotiated
outcomes in criminal cases reflects resource concerns and of½cial policy of
treating minor cases leniently.13 Yet the
encouragement of settlement and compensation in criminal cases also mirrors
state apprehension about escalation and
protest. Ensuring victims are compensated
reduces the possibility of escalation or protest by victims; reducing sentences minimizes the risk of discontent from defendants’ families. But whether negotiated
outcomes actually produce stability is
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unclear: criminal cases continue to be a
primary source of complaints concerning
the courts, in particular from victims’ families suspicious that defendants will avoid
punishment through backroom deals.
Concerns about stability also affect
how judges interpret and apply the law in
cases that are resolved through adjudication. In tort cases, most notably medical
disputes, it is routine for judges to adjust
outcomes to ensure that aggrieved litigants receive compensation, even when
there is no formal legal basis for doing so.
Judges adopt flexible interpretations of
law in order to ensure that aggrieved persons receive compensation in a range of
potentially contentious cases, most notably labor disputes and those involving
corporate dissolution and bankruptcy
(where layoffs are a risk).14 Courts in China
are innovative, but innovation often serves
to insulate courts and judges from criticism, not increase court authority.
Courts in the Hu–Wen era came under
extreme pressure to respond to and prevent protest. The volume of “litigation
related” petitions and protests surged in
the late 1990s and early 2000s.15 “Letters
and visits of½ces” exist at all levels of the
Chinese state to receive and process complaints from citizens. Many other party
and state entities, including the courts,
the media, and procuratorates, also have
their own letters and visits of½ces to handle complaints. Thus “litigation related”
petitions may be ½led with letters and visits of½ces, with courts, or with letters and
visits of½ces at other party-state organizations. Judges and courts are evaluated
and ranked based on the number of complaints ½led. Complaints or protests about
courts are viewed as evidence that judges
have not handled the case correctly regardless of the merits of the complaint.
Petitions about the courts reflect problems in the courts, including corruption
and lack of competence. But such com-

plaints are also a sign of disconnect between popular use of law and the capacity
of the legal system to respond. One common source of complaints, for example, is
unenforced decisions. In some cases,
however, lack of enforcement results from
the inability of a defendant to pay, not
from inaction by the courts. Likewise, in
contentious cases, most notably land disputes, petitions and protests often result
from the fact that courts lack suf½cient
authority to act.
Courts take extreme steps to eliminate
complaints. One response has been greater
use of mediation, reflecting the view that
mediated cases are less likely to result in
protest. But courts also maintain dedicated
funds that they use to persuade petitioners
to stop petitioning, agree to reopen and
rehear previously decided cases in response to complaints, and deploy staff to
Beijing to intercept and forcibly return
home those who seek to ½le complaints
to authorities in the capital. Compensation
and mediation agreements frequently
include promises by litigants not to petition. Adherence to legal rules is of secondary importance to eliminating the
potential for unrest, with courts adjusting
outcomes or pressuring defendants to pay
additional sums to plaintiffs in already
decided cases.16 Although of½cial statistics
reported a dramatic drop in the volume
of litigation-related petitions ½led in the
latter half of the 2000s, judges report that
the pressure they face from petitioners
has not declined.
Protest likewise influences cases that
never make it to court. Concern about
unrest is a key factor influencing settlement decisions in areas such as medical
malpractice litigation and labor disputes,
where defendants often agree to pay signi½cantly more than legally required in
order to head off possible protest and violence.17 The threat of violence is real: reports of aggrieved patients or their fami-
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lies attacking doctors have become common, as has the practice of family members leaving the body of the deceased at
the hospital (sometimes in the lobby) in
protest while negotiations over compensation proceed. Specialized intermediaries now exist in many locations to assist
people seeking compensation outside the
formal legal system, with professional
protestors congregating outside hospitals
and specialized debt collectors working
in many areas.18 Of½cials have acted
quickly to ensure that some of the most
sensitive disputes, such as those arising out
of the Wenchuan earthquake, the Wenzhou high-speed rail accident, and the
melamine-contaminated milk scandal,
never make it to court. In all three cases,
potential plaintiffs were encouraged or
compelled to agree to quick settlements.
Courts have also refused to accept cases
on a wide range of issues linked to social
unrest, such as land disputes. Courts lack
authority to accept many sensitive cases
and refuse to accept such cases even
when they do have the authority.
Scholarship on protest in China, as
Ching Kwan Lee notes in her essay in this
issue, has identi½ed threats of escalation
and group action as key determinants of a
protest’s success. However, evidence from
the legal system shows that courts are at
times responsive to individuals who pose
little threat of collective action.19 The
incentives for local of½cials to stop even
individual petitioners suggest that existence of such grievances is perceived as a
threat to the party-state’s legitimacy.
State concerns about stability and legitimacy are also manifest in of½cial
embrace of populism in the legal system
and in calls for greater party supervision,
in part the result of the perception that
courts are an important source of public
discontent. The term populism in the Chinese legal system includes a broad range
of external factors that affect legal insti143 (2) Spring 2014

tutions, including traditional and online Benjamin L.
media as well as collective protests. Liebman
Appeals to populism often mix with party
efforts to assert oversight over the courts.
The blending of populism and party
oversight was captured most clearly in
the promotion of the “three supremes”
by former Supreme People’s Court President Wang Shengjun in 2008: the supremacy of the party’s business, the
supremacy of popular interests, and the
supremacy of the constitution and law.
Courts in recent years have welcomed
greater oversight by people’s congresses,
have increased roles for laypeople in
hearing cases, and have emphasized public
opinion in court decisions. Such steps
contrast with the modest efforts in the
direction of greater professionalism in
the legal system in the 1990s. Courts have
been encouraged to work together with
other party and government entities to
mitigate risks of instability.20 Judges and
procurators are increasingly well trained,
but such training does not equip them to
resist populist pressure. Nor are they supposed to do so: judges are explicitly
incentivized to take account of public
opinion.
Of½cial embrace of populism and renewed emphasis on Communist Party
oversight of the courts is at times explicitly linked to rejection of foreign models of
legal development. Legal education has
likewise become increasingly ideological
in recent years.21 Yet not all recent efforts
to emphasize links between the courts
and the public are efforts to assert greater
party-state oversight. Courts have also
taken steps to educate ordinary people
about law. Some recent developments,
such as court efforts to put opinions
online and to make courts more accessible
to litigants in rural areas, also suggest that
courts may be seeking to use appeals to
public opinion and populism to boost their
own legitimacy.
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Outside the courts, a range of other
party-state institutions assumed active
roles in resolving contentious issues and
ordinary disputes in the early 2000s. Stability maintenance work has been coordinated by the Central Commission on
Comprehensive Social Management, a
joint party and government body that is
equal in rank to, but formally exists as a
separate entity from, the party’s Central
Political Legal Committee (plc). The
Stability Maintenance Leadership Small
Group also exists at the national level directly under the Standing Committee of
the Politburo; it appears to be focused on
responding to speci½c incidents of unrest.
Both entities have their work of½ces
within the plc. This structure of multiple organizations working to address
threats to stability is replicated at the
provincial and municipal levels, although
at the local level stability maintenance
of½ces are often combined with petitioning of½ces into “stability maintenance
centers.”22 The party-state has devoted
extensive resources to stability maintenance organizations. Local stability maintenance of½cials often have extensive roles,
including the power to intercept and detain petitioners, pay petitioners to settle
grievances, and mediate disputes.23 These
roles reflect efforts to maintain stability at
all costs, as well as unease with allowing
the legal system to take on the primary
role in resolving threats to stability.
Legal reform did not stop in the Hu–
Wen era; important reforms continued
throughout the period. Most involved
the development of China’s legal hardware: new laws and regulations designed
to regulate an increasingly complex society. Important examples include the passage of new Property and Tort Laws and
major revisions to China’s Criminal Law,
Criminal Procedure Law, and juvenile justice system. Changes to the Criminal Law
and to court review procedures for capi-

tal cases resulted in signi½cant decreases
in the frequency of death sentences. If
fully implemented, revisions to the Criminal Procedure Law have the potential to
make the criminal justice process signi½cantly more fair for criminal defendants. The volume of civil cases in the
courts also rose, from 4.8 million in 2003
to 7.2 million in 2011, with most of the
increase coming in the latter portion of
the Hu–Wen decade.24 China now hosts
the largest volume of copyright litigation
of any country in the world. Expanded
public space for legal debate has also meant
that most of the issues discussed above
are widely debated in China, especially
online.
Legal developments in the 2000s nevertheless suggested that party-state leaders
were uncertain about the utility of legal
procedures and institutions as mechanisms for addressing perceived threats to
stability. Having devoted impressive resources to constructing a legal system in
the 1980s and 1990s, the Chinese partystate retreated from using the system in
the face of new social problems in the
2000s. Many within China have pointed
out that such policies have produced a
vicious circle. Incentives for of½cials encourage responsiveness to threats of
unrest. Responsiveness, in turn, encourages others to pursue their grievance outside the legal system, or to nao ting, or cause
chaos, in the courtroom. The emphasis
on stability has also encouraged new
forms of abuses, including the creation of
“black jails,” privately run detention centers hired by local authorities to intercept
and detain those who travel to Beijing to
petition or protest.25

What are the sources of China’s lawstability paradox? Four primary factors
have had particular influence. First, the
color revolutions in Eastern Europe and
Central Asia in the early 2000s and the

Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences

Arab Spring of 2011 appeared to raise
concerns at the top of the party-state that
legal reforms threatened its authority.
The emergence of a dedicated group of
“rights lawyers” willing to take on cases
that the party-state viewed as sensitive,
including representing Falun Gong adherents, political dissidents, and the victims of mass disasters, may have heightened such concerns. The arguments of
rights lawyers almost always consist of
demands that of½cials follow the law, not
explicit calls for political change. Such
arguments were viewed by at least some
in the political-legal system as threats to
party authority. Yet such trends have limited explanatory power. Legal institutions
in China remain under direct party-state
oversight and have shown little evidence
of developing into “sites of resistance” to
authoritarian rule.26 Little in the way of
credible threats to the party-state emerged
from the courts or legal profession. Arguments that legal reform and calls for judicial independence represented foreign
attempts to subvert the Chinese system
appear largely to have been strategic efforts by conservatives seeking to slow the
pace of reform and reassert party-state
oversight.
Second, the most controversial trends in
the legal system in the 2000s all had roots
in China’s revolutionary and prerevolutionary past. Recent literature has noted
the ways in which China’s revolutionary
traditions have contributed to regime resilience.27 The law-stability paradox is in
part the consequence of revolutionary
traditions and shows that they may be
both a resource and a constraint. Populism, lack of differentiation among legal
and nonlegal actors, the importance of
petitioning, reliance on political campaigns, and the embrace of flexible interpretations of law all reflect a continuation
of traditional Communist Party approaches to governance and law.28 Such trends
143 (2) Spring 2014

may have been less apparent in the 1990s Benjamin L.
when the system embraced professional- Liebman
ization, but they have always been present.
Faced with a perception of increased
instability in the 2000s, China’s leaders
reverted to using approaches to law and
governance with which they were familiar.
A short-term focus on reducing instability
ampli½ed the importance of such approaches.
Third, China’s law-stability paradox
reflects the party-state’s conception of its
own legitimacy. The central party-state has
linked its legitimacy to outcomes and has
perpetuated the idea of central of½cials
being “father and mother of½cials” who
are responsive to the grievances of ordinary people. In so doing, the party-state
has created a dynamic in which it believes
it must respond to complaints that threaten to escalate into unrest, even when the
response violates legal norms. The Chinese
party-state is at times over-responsive to
individual or group protest. Of½cial intervention transforms private law disputes
such as tort or labor cases into negotiations with the state. Of½cial intervention
encourages others likewise to seek redress
outside the legal system. Law in China
operates in the shadow of protest, with legal issues transformed into political questions–the opposite of de Tocqueville’s
observation about the United States that
“[s]carcely any political question arises . . .
that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a
judicial question.”29 Strengthening the
role law plays in regulating Chinese society and citizen-state interactions may
require not only boosting legal institutions but altering the ways in which the
party-state conceives of its own legitimacy,
shifting from a focus on results, responsiveness to individual grievances, and
populism to legitimacy based on adherence to legal procedures and norms.
Fourth, of½cial reluctance to commit to
greater use of law reflects ambiguity about
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whether law is the best tool for managing
a society undergoing rapid and unprecedented social transformation. This is evident both in the failure to follow laws on
the books in complex or sensitive cases
and in reliance on nonlegal institutions
in a wide range of routine cases. Recent
literature on the Western ½nancial crisis
has noted the ways in which excessive
reliance on formal rules can constrain
actors in ways that deepen the crisis.30
China’s leadership may not have explicitly
embraced such reasoning; but elements
of China’s approach to managing instability, in particular the continued desire
to be able to move rapidly and flexibly,
have parallels to those in the West who
argue that excessive reliance on legal rules
can at times worsen unstable situations.
Steps taken by China’s new leaders in
2013 suggest recognition of the need to
refocus the party-state on adherence to
legal rules. Most notable among announced reforms have been plans to
abolish the widely condemned reeducation through labor detention system and
renewed efforts to rein in corruption.
The Third Plenum’s resolution in November 2013 emphasized the importance
of human rights, the constitution, and
judicial independence, suggesting a desire
to reduce external influence on the courts.
The resolution also called for reexamination of the role of court adjudication committees,31 expansion of legal aid, greater
emphasis on transparency in the courts,
elimination of the use of torture, addressing and avoiding wrongful convictions, and reducing the number of crimes
subject to the death penalty. The resolution
provides only a general framework for reform; nevertheless, it has been interpreted
by some within China as signaling renewed
commitment to legal reform. There are
also serious efforts underway to implement
the revised Criminal Procedure Law, which
went into effect on January 1, 2013.

There are indications that the state is
concerned about curbing some of the
worst abuses, in particular when they are
committed against ordinary people, not
activists. In early 2013, numerous Chinese
media accounts highlighted abusive illegal
conduct by local of½cials or those employed by them, including cases of forced
abortion, violent conduct by those enforcing relocation and demolition orders
on expropriated property, and horri½c
conditions in reeducation through labor
detention facilities. More recently, in late
2013 and early 2014, reports circulated that
party of½cials were investigating former
Politburo Standing Committee member
Zhou Yongkang, the person most closely
associated with the stability-at-all-costs
approach of the 2000s. Some view such
developments as a sign that party-state
leaders are serious about reducing abuses
committed in the name of stability, and
are committed to greater use of formal
legal institutions to address social conflict.
Yet proposed reforms have come alongside renewed focus on stability, reflected
most clearly in the announced creation of
a new National Security Commission under the direct leadership of Xi Jinping.
The exact structure and role of the commission and its relationship to existing
institutions remain unclear. It is clear,
however, that the new commission reflects
continued and deepening commitment
to addressing perceived external and
internal threats to security and stability.
Proposed legal reforms are not likely to
have much signi½cance for individuals
the state views as threats.32 This has been
made apparent by the reemergence of
party-state concerns that legal reforms
could be used to challenge its authority.
Reports have noted bans issued by party
of½cials on the discussion of topics such
as “judicial independence” and “constitutionalism” in the media and in universities.33 A number of prominent legal
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activists were detained in the second half
of 2013, most notably legal scholar Xu
Zhiyong, who was subsequently sentenced
to four years in prison. This crackdown
on legal activists suggests that the boundaries of politically permissible activities
are shrinking even as party-state leaders
call for renewed focus on law. Xi Jinping
has also reemphasized the role of Mass
Line ideology, suggesting that fundamental changes to the political-legal system
are not likely. There are signs that some
individuals who formerly would have
been sentenced to reeducation through
labor are being detained through other
forms of arbitrary detention. Although
some of the announced reforms have the
potential to make the legal system more
effective and fair in a range of cases, the
party-state’s emphasis on “rule of law
China” is unlikely to bring fundamental
changes to the ways the party-state views
and uses law. “Rule of law China” will likely continue to include the explicit embrace
of populism, rejection of Western models,
and the reliance on a range of legal and
nonlegal actors to address social conflict.

C

hina’s law-stability paradox also highlights the challenges facing any renewed
efforts at legal reform. The challenge for
any serious efforts to strengthen the role of
law in addressing social conflict is not only
to realign incentives so that local of½cials
follow legal rules; it is also to convince
those most likely to engage in acts of unrest or resistance that the legal system can
protect their interests. A growing body of
literature provides empirical support for
the popular perception that the legal system increasingly serves the interests of the
elite.34 Greater emphasis on populism
alone is unlikely to change this perception.
Tensions also remain between new legal rules and popular conceptions of justice. Efforts to adjust law to align with
popular views risk creating new inequali143 (2) Spring 2014

ties and undermining the authority of Benjamin L.
legal institutions. Recognizing that legal Liebman
outcomes sometimes do not align with
popular conceptions of justice may be
necessary to strengthening the authority
of legal institutions and to reducing instability. Yet bridging the divide between
new legal norms and popular views may
be hard, as evidenced by dif½culties in
enforcing new provisions in the Criminal
Procedure Law. Initial evidence suggests
that signi½cant progress is being made in
implementing provisions that make it
easier for counsel to see their clients and
access evidence.35 Such changes are relatively easy to implement because they
require only changing state conduct. Yet
it appears that little progress has been
made in encouraging or compelling witnesses to appear at trial, which is also required by the new law.36 Enforcing such
provisions requires not only changing
state behavior but also addressing traditional reluctance to become involved in
legal disputes, in particular those in which
witnesses do not have a stake.
Deepening legal reform also requires
breaking the cycles of public distrust that
undermine the authority of legal institutions. The party-state continues to rely on
party institutions, not the courts, to handle the most pressing problems. Recent
efforts to combat corruption, for example,
have continued to rely primarily on the
Communist Party’s Discipline Inspection
Commission (dic), a body that is not subject to any legal oversight and that has extensive powers to investigate and detain
suspects. Reliance on such party institutions may reflect doubts about whether
the courts have the capacity to address
such problems. Such reliance reinforces
the secondary role played by legal actors.
Courts are trapped in a similar cycle of
popular distrust. Legal institutions often
appear weak, lacking the authority to decide contentious cases and unable to
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enforce decisions in disputes they do
adjudicate. As a result, individuals frequently seek recourse outside the legal system. Their success in doing so further
undermines con½dence in legal institutions. The lack of trust from party of½cials
and the public also means that legal institutions are not given the authority to act
in ways that might allow them to increase
public con½dence.
China’s new leaders face an environment in which legal reform is both easier
and more dif½cult than in the past. Investment in legal infrastructure over the
past three decades has created the institutional capacity to resolve a widening
range of disputes through the formal legal
process, fostered constituencies pushing
for reform from within the legal system,
and legitimized debate about legal issues.
The Chinese system remains capable of
rapid change, in particular in the face of
perceived crisis. At the same time, populism has reemerged as an important factor in the legal system, the legal system is
increasingly viewed as protecting the
interests of the elite, party-state leaders
appear unable or unwilling to let the legal
system handle the most contentious issues, and there appears to be signi½cant
uncertainty about the utility of autonomous legal institutions. Academic literature has long noted a question inherent in
efforts to construct authoritarian legality:
how far can the legal system develop without challenging authoritarian rule? China
has largely avoided this question, in part
due to the extensive state oversight of the
legal system. Any signi½cant efforts to restart legal reform will make the question
central to discussions about the future of
law in China.
In contrast to other ½elds surveyed in
this volume such as environmental policy
or social policies, few working in the Chinese legal system compare China’s system
to that of other developing, authoritarian,

or post-Communist countries. Chinese legal academics and legal professionals assess China’s legal development not with
reference to that of post-Communist
Russia or even Singapore, but to the legal
systems of the United States or Western
Europe–albeit often an over-idealized
form of Western legality. In some respects,
China’s legal reforms appear to have been
relatively successful when compared to
other middle-income countries or to postCommunist countries not tethered to the
European Union. China has hundreds of
thousands of legal professionals and a
system that was almost unimaginable at
the beginning of the reform era in 1978.
Yet metrics for evaluating legal development are often elusive and misleading.37
The number of laws, legal personnel, or
cases tells very little about the overall
fairness or effectiveness of the Chinese
legal system. Assessing China’s legal system is also dif½cult because such evaluations vary depending on whose interests
are prioritized: those of the state or those
of ordinary people. Different legal systems
serve different functions, and such functions may change over time within the
same country. Placing China’s legal development in comparative context highlights the fact that there is no single form
of or path to legal development and that
nonconvergence with Western models of
legality may be as likely as convergence.
China’s recent experiences also highlight
dif½culties inherent in using law both to
legitimize the state and to constrain state
action in an authoritarian state undergoing rapid social transformation.
China’s law-stability paradox reflects
uncertainty about how best to respond to
instability and the dif½culty of adapting
legal rules to a rapidly changing society.
The paradox also reflects the challenge of
creating new legal rules and institutions
in a political system where legitimacy
continues to be based on populist respon-
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siveness and delivery of economic growth.
Shifting to a system in which legitimacy
is based on adherence to legal rules, not
just rhetorical commitment to such rules,
may be necessary for resolving the lawstability paradox. Doing so may require

changing not only how the Chinese party- Benjamin L.
state conceives of the relationship be- Liebman
tween law and stability, but also how it
conceives of its own role in managing
China’s social transformation.
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